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Abstract
In this work, we investigate the problem of private statistical analysis in the dis-
tributed and semi-honest setting. In particular, we study properties of Private
Stream Aggregation schemes, first introduced by Shi et al. [27]. These are com-
putationally secure protocols for the aggregation of data in a network and have a
very small communication cost. We show that such schemes can be built upon any
key-homomorphic weak pseudo-random function. Thus, in contrast to the afore-
mentioned work, our security definition can be achieved in the standard model. In
addition, we give a computationally efficient instantiation of this protocol based on
the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem. Moreover, we show that every mechanism
which preserves pǫ, δq-differential privacy provides computational pǫ, δq-differential
privacy when it is executed through a Private Stream Aggregation scheme. Finally,
we introduce a novel perturbation mechanism based on the Skellam distribution
that is suited for the distributed setting, and compare its performances with those
of previous solutions.
1 Introduction
The framework of statistical disclosure control aims at providing strong privacy guaran-
tees for the records stored in a database while enabling accurate statistical analyses to
be performed. In recent years, differential privacy has become one of the most important
paradigms for privacy-preserving statistical analyses. Generally, the notion of differential
privacy is considered in the centralised setting where we assume the existence of a trusted
curator [4, 8, 10, 21] who collects data in the clear, perturbs it properly (e.g. by adding
Laplace noise) and publishes it. In this way, the output statistics are not significantly
influenced by the presence (resp. absence) of a particular record in the database.
In this work, we study how to preserve differential privacy when we cannot rely on a
trusted curator. In this so-called distributed setting, the users have to send their data to
an untrusted aggregator. Preserving differential privacy and achieving high accuracy in
the distributed setting is of course harder than in the centralised setting, since the users
have to execute a perturbation mechanism on their own. In order to achieve the same
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accuracy as provided by well-known techniques in the centralised setting, the work by
Shi et al. [27] introduces the Private Stream Aggregation (PSA) scheme, a cryptographic
protocol which enables each user to securely send encrypted time-series data to an ag-
gregator. The aggregator is then able to decrypt the aggregate of all data in each time
step, but cannot retrieve any further information about the individual data. Using such
a protocol, the task of perturbation can be split among the users, such that differential
privacy is preserved and high accuracy is guaranteed. For a survey of applications of
this protocol, we refer to [27].
In [27], a PSA scheme for sum queries is provided and some strong security guarantees
under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption are shown. However, this instantiation
has some limitations. First, the security only holds in the random oracle model; second,
its decryption algorithm requires the solution of the discrete logarithm in a given range,
which can be very time-consuming if the number of users and the plaintext space are
large. Moreover, since a PSA scheme provides computational security, the perturbation
mechanism in use can only provide a computational version of differential privacy, a
notion first introduced by Mironov et al. [22]. In [27], however, a connection between
the security of a PSA scheme and differential privacy is not explicitly shown. In a sub-
sequent work by Chan et al. [7], this connection is still not completely established, since
the polynomial-time reduction between an attacker against a PSA scheme and a database
distinguisher is missing.
Objectives. In order to overcome the limitations of the construction in [27], in this
work we address the following problems.
• We want to give sufficient conditions for a PSA scheme which has a security guar-
antee in the standard model.
• According to these conditions, we want to construct a concrete instantiation con-
sisting of efficient algorithms, even when the number of users and the plaintext
space become large.
• We aim at showing that an information-theoretical differentially private mecha-
nism preserves computational differential privacy when it is executed through a
(computationally) secure PSA scheme.
• We want to investigate differentially private mechanisms suitable for an execution
through a PSA scheme.
Contributions. We achieve the aforementioned goals in the following manner. In order
to derive sufficient conditions for PSA schemes with a certain security guarantee, we
lower the requirements of Aggregator Obliviousness from [27] by abrogating the attacker’s
possibility to adaptively compromise users during the execution of a PSA scheme with
time-series data. We show that a PSA scheme for achieving this lower security level
can be built upon any key-homomorphic weak pseudo-random function. Since weak
pseudo-randomness can be achieved in the standard model, this condition also enables
secure schemes in the standard model. In particular, we can build a key-homomorphic
weak pseudo-random function based on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption in the
group of quadratic residues modulo a squared safe prime. This function is used for
the construction of a PSA scheme for sum queries. By comparing the running times
and practical performances of our PSA scheme and the one given by Shi et al. [27]
at the same security level, we find that our solution provides a significant speed-up for
decryption when the plaintext space is large while decelerating the encryption only by a
constant factor.
Reduction-based security proofs for cryptographic schemes usually require an at-
tacker in the corresponding security game to send two different plaintexts (or plaintext
collections) to a challenger. The adversary receives then back a ciphertext which is the
encryption of one of these collections and has to guess which one it is. In any security
definition for a PSA scheme, these collections must satisfy a particular requirement (i.e.
they must lead to the same aggregate), since the attacker has the capability to decrypt
them (different aggregates would make the adversary’s task trivial). In general, however,
this requirement cannot be satisfied in the context of differential privacy. Introducing a
novel kind of security reduction which deploys a biased coin flip, we can show that, when-
ever a randomised perturbation procedure is involved in a PSA scheme, the requirement
of having collections with equal aggregate can be abolished. This result can be gener-
alised to any cryptographic scheme with such a requirement. Using this property, we are
able to show that if a mechanism preserves differential privacy, then it preserves compu-
tational differential privacy when it is used as a randomised perturbation procedure in
a PSA scheme.
Finally, we compare three mechanisms: the Geometric mechanism from [27], the Bi-
nomial mechanism from [9] and the Skellam mechanism introduced in this work. All
three mechanisms preserve differential privacy and make use of discrete probability dis-
tributions. Therefore, they are well-suited for an execution through a PSA scheme. For
generating the right amount of noise among all users, these mechanisms apply two differ-
ent approaches. While in the Geometric mechanism, with high probability, only one user
generates the noise necessary for differential privacy, the Binomial and Skellam mecha-
nisms allow all users to generate noise of small variance, that sums up to the required
value for privacy. We show that for high privacy levels, the theoretical error bound of the
Skellam mechanism is slightly better than that of the other two. At the same time, we
provide experimental results showing that the Geometric and Skellam mechanisms have
a comparable accuracy in practice, while beating the one of the Binomial mechanism.
Related Work. As pointed out above, our contributions are mostly related to the
work of Shi et al. [27] and Chan et al. [7]. Privacy-preserving aggregation of time-
series data in the presence of an untrusted aggregator has also been studied in various
other works, e.g. [3, 11, 18, 19, 16]. Beimel et al. [3] and Eigner et al. [11] show
that secure multi-party computation techniques can be used for data aggregation under
differential privacy. These techniques usually have a high communication cost, whereas
PSA requires each user to send exactly one message per time-step. The protocol given by
Rastogi et al. [25] is based on the threshold Paillier cryptosystem. It requires an extra
round of interaction between the users and the aggregator in every time-step in order
to decrypt the sum queries. In contrast, PSA requires the users to interact with the
aggregator only for sending the ciphertexts. A´cs et al. [2] use an additive homomorphic
encryption scheme for sending time-series data, but it requires the generation of a pair
of encryption/decryption keys for each pair of users. Moreover, reuse of key pairs for
different time-steps potentially leads to security breaches. In a PSA scheme each user
gets only one encryption key, which can be securely used for every time-step. Using
additive homomorphic encryption, Rieffel et al. [26] construct a scheme which does not
require extra rounds of interaction, but is not fully resistant against collusions and the
cost of computation and storage is roughly equal to the number of compromised users
that is tolerable by the system. Li et al. [18, 19] use the homomorphic encryption scheme
given by Castelluccia et al. [5, 6] in order to construct an efficient protocol for sending
data in mobile sensing applications. This scheme is resistant against collusions, but each
user has to store multiple keys, depending on the number of compromised users in the
network. Moreover, for encryption and decryption the scheme requires the computation
of as many pseudo-random values as the number of keys in the network, making the
computational effort for the analyst rather high. Thus, the costs of this scheme depend
on the number of compromised users. A PSA scheme is fully resistant against any number
of collusions and furthermore, we provide a solution, where the computation and storage
costs are independent of the number of users. Joye et al. [16] provide a protocol with
the same security guarantees as in [27] in the random oracle model. The security of their
scheme relies on the DCR assumption (rather than DDH as in [27]) and as a result, in
the security reduction they can remove a factor which is cubic in the number of users.
However, their scheme involves a trusted party for setting some public parameters. In
this work we provide an instantiation of our generic PSA construction, which is similar
to the one in [16] but relies on the DDH assumption. While in our generic security
reduction we cannot avoid the cubic factor in the number of users, our construction does
not involve any trusted party and has security guarantees in the standard model.
Another series of works deals with a distributed generation of noise for preserving
differential privacy. Dwork et al. [9] consider the Gaussian distribution for splitting
the task of noise generation among all users. Their proposed scheme requires more
interactions between the users than our solution. In [2], privacy-preserving data aggre-
gation is applied to smart metering and the generation of Laplace noise is performed in
a distributed manner, since each meter simply generates the difference of two Gamma
distributed random variables as a share of a Laplace distributed random variable. In
[25] each user generates a share of Laplace noise by generating a vector of four Gaussian
random variables. For a survey of the mechanisms given in [25] and [2], we refer to [14].
However, the aforementioned mechanisms generate noise drawn according to continuous
distributions, but for the use in a PSA scheme, discrete noise is required. Therefore,
we consider proper discrete distributions and compare their performances for private
statistical analyses.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Problem statement
In this work, we consider a distributed and semi-honest setting where n users are asked
to participate in some statistical analyses but do not trust the data analyst (or aggre-
gator), who is assumed to be honest but curious. Therefore, the users cannot provide
their own data in the clear. Moreover, they communicate solely and independently with
the untrusted aggregator, who wants to analyse the users data by means of queries in
time-series and aims at obtaining answers as accurate as possible. More specifically,
assume that the data items belong to a data universe D. For a sequence of time-steps
t P T , where T is a discrete time period, the analyst sends queries which are answered
by the users in a distributed manner. Each query is modeled as a function f : Dn Ñ O
for a finite or countably infinite set of possible outputs (i.e. answers to the query) O.
We also assume that some users may act in order to compromise the privacy of the
other participants. More precisely, we assume the existence of a publicly known con-
stant γ P p0, 1s which is the a priori estimate of the lower bound on the fraction of
non-compromised users who honestly follow the protocol and want to release useful
information about their data (with respect to a particular query f), while preserving
pǫ, δq-differential privacy. The remaining p1´ γq-fraction of users is assumed to be com-
promised. Compromised users honestly follow the protocol but are aimed at violating
the privacy of non-compromised users. For that purpose, these users form a coalition
with the analyst and send her auxiliary information, e.g. their own data in the clear.
For computing the answers to the aggregator’s queries, a special cryptographic proto-
col, called Private Stream Aggregation (first introduced in [27]), is used by all users.
In connection with a perturbation mechanism, this scheme assures that the analyst is
only able to learn a noisy aggregate of the users’ data (as close as possible to the real
answer fpDq) and nothing else. In contrast to common secure multi-party techniques
[12, 13, 20], this protocol requires each user to send to the analyst only one message per
query.
2.2 Definitions
We consider a database as an element D P Dn, where D is the data universe and n
is the number of users. Since D may contain sensitive information, the users want to
protect their privacy. Therefore, a privacy-preserving mechanism must be applied. Un-
less stated differently, we always assume that a mechanism is applied in the distributed
setting. Differential privacy [10] is a well-established notion for privacy-preserving sta-
tistical analyses. We recall that a randomised mechanism preserves differential privacy if
its application on two adjacent databases, i.e. databases which differ in one entry only,
leads to close distributions of the output.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy [10]). Let R be a (possibly infinite) set and let n P N.
A randomised mechanism A : Dn Ñ R preserves pǫ, δq-differential privacy (short: DP),
if for all adjacent databases D0, D1 P Dn and all R Ď R:
PrrApD0q P Rs ď eǫ ¨ PrrApD1q P Rs ` δ.
The probability space is defined over the randomness of A.
The additional parameter δ is necessary for mechanisms which cannot preserve ǫ-DP
(i.e. pǫ, 0q-DP) for certain cases. However, if the probability that these cases occur is
bounded by δ, then the mechanism preserves pǫ, δq-DP.
In the literature, there are well-established mechanisms for preserving differential
privacy, e.g. the Laplace mechanism [10] and the Exponential mechanism [21]. In order
to privately evaluate a query, these mechanisms draw noisy values according to some
distribution depending on the query’s global sensitivity.
Definition 2 (Global Sensitivity [10]). The global sensitivity Spfq of a query
f : Dn Ñ Rk is defined as
Spfq “ max
D0,D1 adjacent
||fpD0q ´ fpD1q||1.
In particular, we will consider sum queries fD : D
n Ñ Z defined as fDpDq :“
řn
i“1 di,
for D “ pd1, . . . , dnq P Dn and D Ď Z.
For measuring how well the output of a mechanism estimates the real data with respect
to a particular query, we use the notion of pα, βq-accuracy.
Definition 3 (Accuracy [29]). The output of a mechanism A achieves pα, βq-accuracy
for a query f : Dn Ñ R if for all D P Dn:
Prr|ApDq ´ fpDq| ď αs ě 1´ β.
The probability space is defined over the randomness of A.
The use of a cryptographic protocol for transferring data provides a computational
security level. If such a protocol is applied for preserving differential privacy, this implies
that only a computational level of differential privacy can be provided. Our definition of
computational differential privacy follows the notion of Chan et al. [7].
Definition 4 (Computational Differential Privacy [7]). Let κ be a security parameter
and n P N with n “ polypκq. A randomised mechanism A : Dn Ñ R preserves computa-
tional pǫ, δq-differential privacy (short: CDP), if for all adjacent databases D0, D1 P Dn
and all probabilistic polynomial-time distinguishers DCDP:
PrrDCDPp1κ,ApD0qq “ 1s ď eǫ ¨ PrrDCDPp1κ,ApD1qq “ 1s ` δ ` negpκq,
where negpκq is a negligible function in κ. The probability space is defined over the
randomness of A and DCDP.
The notion of computational differential privacy is a natural computational-
indistinguishability-extension of the information-theoretical definition. The advantage
is that preserving differential privacy only against bounded attackers helps to substan-
tially reduce the error of the answer provided by the mechanism. In Section 3, we
investigate how to obtain a computationally secure protocol which allows the analyst to
compute only the aggregate of all users’ data and no further information. The scheme
for sum queries we are going to construct uses a special mapping into a group, which we
define formally.
Definition 5 (v-isomorphic embedding). An injective mapping ϕ : t´v, . . . , vu Ñ V ,
where pV, ˝q is a group, is a v-isomorphic embedding if for all n P N and all finite
sequences paiqi“1,...,n of values in t´v, . . . , vu with |
ř
i ai| ď v:
ϕ
˜
nÿ
i“1
ai
¸
“ ϕpa1q ˝ . . . ˝ ϕpanq.
From this definition it is clear that a v-isomorphic embedding is also v1-isomorphic
for every integer 0 ă v1 ď v. In the analysis of the secure protocol, we furthermore make
use of the following definition.
Definition 6 (Weak PRF [24]). Let κ be a security parameter. Let A,B,C be sets. A
family of functions
F “ tFa |Fa : B Ñ CuaPA
is called a weak pseudo-random function (PRF) family if for all probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithms D
Op¨q
PRF with oracle access to Op¨q (where Op¨q P tFap¨q, randp¨qu) on any
polynomial number of uniformly chosen inputs, we have:
|PrrDFap¨qPRFpκq “ 1s ´ PrrDrandp¨qPRF pκq “ 1s| ď negpκq,
where a PR A and rand PR tf | f : B Ñ Cu is a random mapping from B to C.
2.3 Mechanism overview
In this work we prove the following result by showing the connection between a key-
homomorphic weak pseudo-random function and a differentially private mechanism for
sum queries.
Theorem 1. Let ǫ ą 0, w ă w1 P Z, m,n P N with maxt|w|, |w1|u ă m. Let
D “ tw, . . . , w1u and fD be a sum query. If there exist groups G1 Ď G, a key-homomorphic
weak pseudo-random function family mapping into G1 and an efficiently computable and
efficiently invertible mn- isomorphic embedding
ϕ : t´mn, . . . ,mnu Ñ G,
then there exists an efficient mechanism for fD that preserves pǫ, δq-CDP for any constant
0 ă δ ă 1 with an error bound of OpSpfDq{ǫq and requires each user to send exactly one
message.
As already described, we want the untrusted analyst to be able to learn some aggre-
gated statistics fDpDq but no additional information about each user’s data. Assume
that we can design a cryptographic protocol that achieves the aforementioned goal. If
we furthermore aim at preserving pǫ, δq-DP, it would be sufficient to add a single copy
of (properly distributed) noise Y to the value fDpDq. Since we cannot add such noise
once the aggregate has been computed, the users have to generate and add noise to their
original data in such a way that the sum of the perturbations has the same distribution
as Y . For this purpose, we see two different approaches. In the first approach, there
is a small probability (depending on the fixed parameter γ) for each user to add noise
sufficient to preserve the privacy of the entire statistics. This probability is calibrated
in such a way only one of the n users is expected to add noise at all. Shi et al. [27]
investigate this method using the Geometric mechanism. In the second approach, each
user generates noise of small variance (again depending on γ), such that the sum of all
noisy terms has enough variance for preserving differential privacy. For this aim, we need
discrete probability distributions which are closed under convolution and are known to
provide differential privacy. The Binomial mechanism [9] and the Skellam mechanism
introduced in this work serve these purposes. In both approaches, the error which is in-
troduced is reasonably small and similar theoretical bounds can be provided. For details,
see Section 5.
For a particular time-step, let the users’ values be of the form xi “ di`ri, i “ 1, . . . , n,
where di P D is the original data of the user i and ri is her noisy value. In the privacy
analysis, it is reasonable to assume that ri “ 0 for the p1´γq¨n compromised users, since
this can only increase their chances to infer some information about the non-compromised
users. In order to send the values to the data analyst, the users perform a PSA scheme.
First, each user encrypts her own time-series data and sends the ciphertexts to the data
analyst. After a distributed key exchange, the evaluation of a single query (i.e. a query
analysed in one time-step) requires each user to send exactly one message. The data
analyst appropriately aggregates the ciphertexts of all users for a particular time-step
and then decrypts the sum of the users’ values
řn
i“1 xi. From the ciphertexts, the data
analyst is not able to leach any additional information about the values of the users,
except for the auxiliary information obtained from the compromised users. In this way,
there is no privacy-breach if only one user adds the entirely needed noise (first approach)
or if the non-compromised users generate noise of low variance (second approach), since
the single values are encrypted and the analyst cannot learn anything about them, ex-
cept for their aggregate. Due to the use of a cryptographic protocol, the plaintexts have
to be discrete. This is the reason why we use discrete distributions for generating the
noisy values ri.
The perturbation of data potentially yields larger values xi due to the (possibly) infi-
nite domain of the underlying probability distribution. Depending on the variance, we
therefore need to choose a sufficiently large interval pD “ t´m, . . . ,mu as plaintext space,
where m ą maxt|w|, |w1|u such that |xi| ď m for all i “ 1, . . . , n with high probability.
In the following, we always assume that D is a subinterval of pD.
Since the protocol used for the data transmission is computationally secure, the entire
mechanism preserves pǫ, δq-CDP.
3 Private Stream Aggregation
In this section, we define the Private Stream Aggregation scheme and give a security
definition for it. Thereby, we mostly follow the concepts introduced by Shi et al. [27],
though we deviate in a few points. Afterwards, we give a condition for the existence of
secure PSA schemes. Moreover, we give a concrete and efficient instantiation of a secure
PSA scheme in the standard model.
3.1 The definition of Private Stream Aggregation and its secu-
rity
Private Stream Aggregation. A PSA scheme is a protocol for safe distributed time-
series data transfer which enables the receiver to learn only the aggregate fp pDq of a
query f : pDn Ñ O over some distributed (and possibly perturbed) database pD P pDn.
Such a scheme needs a key exchange protocol for all n users together with the analyst
as a precomputation, and requires each user to send exactly one message per query. For
the definition of PSA, we follow [27].
Definition 7 (Private Stream Aggregation). Let κ be a security parameter and n P N
with n “ polypκq. A Private Stream Aggregation scheme Σ “ pSetup,PSAEnc,PSADecq
is defined by three probabilistic polynomial-time Algorithms:
Setup: ppp, T, s, s1, . . . , snq Ð Setupp1κq, where pp are public parameters of the system,
T is a set of time-steps and s, s1, . . . , sn are private keys.
PSAEnc: For time-step t P T and all i “ 1, . . . , n:
ci,t Ð PSAEncsipt, xiq for a data value xi P pD.
PSADec: For time-step t P T , ciphertexts c1,t, . . . , cn,t P C, where C is the range of
PSAEnc, and a query f : pDn Ñ O compute
fpx11, . . . , x1nq “ PSADecspt, c1,t, . . . , cn,tq.
For all t P T and x1, . . . , xn P pD:
PSADecspt,PSAEncs1pt, x1q, . . . ,PSAEncsnpt, xnqq
“fpx1, . . . , xnq.
The Setup-phase has to be carried out just once and for all, and can be performed
with a secure multi-party protocol among all users and the analyst. In all other phases,
no communication between the users is needed.
The system parameters pp are public and constant for all time-steps with the implicit
understanding that they are used in Σ. Every user encrypts her data xi with her own
secret key si and sends the ciphertext to the analyst. If the analyst receives the cipher-
texts of all users for a time-step t, it can compute the aggregate, i.e. the evaluation of
the query f , of the users’ data with the decryption key s.
Security. Since our model allows the analyst to compromise users, the aggregator can
obtain auxiliary information about the data of the compromised users or their secret
keys. Even then a secure PSA scheme should release no more information than the ag-
gregate of the non-compromised users’ data in a single time-step.
Informally, a PSA scheme Σ is secure if every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm,
with knowledge of the analyst’s and compromised users’ keys and with adaptive encryp-
tion queries, has only negligible advantage in distinguishing between the encryptions
of two databases pD0, pD1 of its choice, where fp pD0q “ fp pD1q. We can assume that an
adversary knows the secret keys of the entire compromised coalition. If the protocol is
secure against such an attacker, then it is also secure against an attacker without the
knowledge of every key from the coalition. Thus, in our security definition we consider
the most powerful adversary. In what follows, let f|X : pD|X| Ñ O denote the evaluation
of a query f : pDn Ñ O with input pD P pDn over a subset X Ď rns of users. The security
definition is similar to the one in [27].
Definition 8 (Security of PSA). Let T be a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary for
a PSA scheme Σ “ pSetup,PSAEnc,PSADecq and let f : pDn Ñ O be a statistical query
over the set pD. Let T be the set of time-steps for possible data analyses. We define the
following security game between a challenger and the adversary T .
Setup. The challenger runs the Setup algorithm on input security parameter κ and
returns public parameters pp, time-steps T with |T | “ polypκq and secret keys
s, s1, . . . , sn. It sends κ, pp, T, s to T .
Queries. The challenger flips a random bit b PR t0, 1u. T chooses U Ď rns and sends
it to the challenger which returns psiqiPrnszU . T is allowed to query pi, t, xiq with
i P U, t P T, xi P pD and the challenger returns
PSAEncsipt, xiq.
Challenge. T chooses t˚ P T such that no encryption query at t˚ was made. (If there
is no such t˚ then the challenger simply aborts.) T queries two different tuples
pxr0si qiPU , pxr1si qiPU with
f|U ppxr0si qiPU q “ f|U ppxr1si qiPU q.
For all i P U the challenger returns
ci,t˚ Ð PSAEncsipt˚, xrbsi q.
Queries. T is allowed to make the same type of queries as before with the restriction
that no encryption query at t˚ can be made.
Guess. T outputs a guess about b.
The adversary wins the game if it correctly guesses b. A PSA scheme is secure if no prob-
abilistic polynomial-time adversary T has more than negligible advantage (with respect
to the parameter κ) in winning the above game.
Encryption queries are made only for i P U , since knowing the secret key for all
i P rnszU the adversary can encrypt a value autonomously. If encryption queries in time-
step t˚ were allowed, then no deterministic scheme would be secure. The adversary T can
determine the original data of all i P rnszU for every time-step, since it knows psiqiPrnszU .
Then T can compute the aggregate of the non-compromised users’ data. For example,
when f “ f pD is a sum query we have f|U p pDq “ PSADecspt, c1,t, . . . , cn,tq ´ f|rnszU p pDq,
where pD “ px1, . . . , xnq and ci,t is the encryption of xi for all i P rns. On the other
hand, if there is a user’s ciphertext which T does not receive, then it cannot obtain the
aggregate for the correspondent time-step.
The security definition indicates that T cannot distinguish between the encryptions of
two different data collections pxr0si qiPU , pxr1si qiPU with the same aggregate at time-step t˚.
For proving that a secure PSA scheme can be used for computing differentially private
statistics with small error, we have to slightly modify the security game such that an
adversary may choose adjacent (and non-perturbed) databases, as it is required in the
definition of differential privacy. For details, see Section 4.
Definition 8 differs from the definition of Aggregator Obliviousness [27] since we require
the adversary to specify the set U of non-compromised users before making any query,
i.e. we do not allow the adversary to determine U adaptively.
3.2 Feasibility of efficient and secure Private Stream Aggrega-
tion
Using a secure PSA scheme, we ensure that the transmitted data of non-compromised
users do not disclose sensitive information other than their aggregate. We now state the
condition for the existence of secure (as in Definition 8) PSA schemes for sum queries.
Theorem 2. Let κ be a security parameter, and m,n P N with logpmq “ polypκq, n “
polypκq. Let pG, ¨q, pS, ˚q be finite groups and G1 Ď G. For some finite set M , let
F “ tFs |Fs :M Ñ G1usPS
be a family of functions which are homomorphic over S and
ϕ : t´mn, . . . ,mnu Ñ G
an mn-isomorphic embedding. If F is a weak PRF family, then the following PSA scheme
Σ “ pSetup,PSAEnc,PSADecq is secure:
Setup: ppp, T, s, s1, . . . , snq Ð Setupp1κq, where pp are parameters of G,G1, S,M,F , ϕ.
The keys are si PR S for all i P rns with s “ p˚ni“1 siq´1 and T ĂM such that all
t P T are chosen uniformly at random from M .
PSAEnc: Compute ci,t “ Fsiptq ¨ ϕpxiq in G, where xi P pD “ t´m, . . . ,mu, t P T .
PSADec: Compute ϕpřni“1 xiq “ Fsptq ¨ c1,t ¨ . . . ¨ cn,t and invert.
Thus, we need a key-homomorphic weak PRF and a mapping which homomorphically
aggregates all users’ data. Since every data value is at most m, the scheme correctly
retrieves the aggregate, which is at most m ¨n, by the mn-isomorphic property of ϕ. Im-
portantly, the product of all pseudo-random values Fsptq,Fs1ptq, . . . ,Fsnptq is the neutral
element in the group G for all t P T . Since the values in T are uniformly distributed in
M , it is enough to require that F is a weak PRF family. Thus, the statement of this
theorem does not require a random oracle.
The proof of Theorem 2 works with a sequence of games and builds on the ideas of [27].
The details of the proof are given in Appendix A. Here we just give the main ideas. In the
first step (Lemma 9) we construct a real-or-random version of the PSA security game,
where encryption is performed equally likely with a weak PRF or a random function.
We show that winning the PSA security game is at least as hard as winning its real-
or-random version. The second step (Lemma 10) shows that the plaintext dependence
of the ciphertexts generated in the game can be abolished. Since we are dealing with
a non-adaptive security definition there is no need of simulating the random choice of
time-steps by programming a random oracle as it is required in the proof of Aggregator
Obliviousness by Shi et al. [27]. Therefore, in contrast to [27], our result does not rely on
a random oracle and the full proof works in the standard model. In the last step, (Lemma
11) using the hybrid argument, we show that winning the game is at least as hard as
distinguishing the weak PRF from a random function. Here the adversary’s specification
of U before making the first query allows the PRF distinguisher to be consistent with
real random values or pseudo-random values in its replies to the queries. All in all, we
get that winning the first game with our construction is at least as hard as distinguishing
the weak PRF from a random function, completing the proof of Theorem 2.
3.3 An efficient Private Stream Aggregation scheme
We give an instantiation of a secure PSA scheme consisting of efficient algorithms. Its
security is based on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem.
Example 1. Let q ą m ¨ n and p “ 2 ¨ q ` 1 be large primes. Let furthermore G “
Z
˚
p2
, S “ Zpq,M “ G1 “ QRp2 and g P Z˚p2 with ordpgq “ pq. Then g generates the
group M “ G1 “ QRp2 of quadratic residues modulo p2. In this group DDH is assumed
to be hard. Then we define
• tppu “ pg, pq. Choose keys s1, . . . , sn PR Zpq and s “ ´
řn
i“1 si mod pq. Let
T ĂM , i.e. t is a power of g for every t P T .
• Fsiptq “ tsi mod p2. This is a weak PRF under the DDH assumption, as can be
proven using arguments similar to the ones in r23s.
• ϕpxiq “ 1 ` p ¨ xi mod p2, where ´m ď xi ď m. (It is easy to see that ϕ is an
mn-isomorphic embedding.)
For aggregation, we compute X P t1´ p ¨mn, . . . , 1` p ¨mnu with
X ”Fsptq ¨
nź
i“1
Fsiptq ¨ ϕpxiq ”
nź
i“1
p1` p ¨ xiq
”1` p ¨
nÿ
i“1
xi ` p2 ¨
ÿ
i,jPrns,j‰i
xixj ` . . .` pn ¨
nź
i“1
xi
”1` p ¨
nÿ
i“1
xi mod p
2
and decrypt
řn
i“1 xi “ 1p pX ´ 1q over the integers.
The difference to the scheme introduced in [27] lies on the map ϕ. Whereas the PRF
in [27] works similarly (the underlying group G is Z˚p rather than Z
˚
p2
), the aggregational
function is defined by
ϕpxiq “ gxi mod p,
which requires to solve the discrete logarithm modulo p for decrypting. In contrast, our
efficient construction only requires a subtraction and a division over the integers.
Remark 1. In the random oracle model, the construction shown in Example 1 achieves
the stronger notion of Aggregator Obliviousness, which is the adaptive version of our
security definition (for details, see the proof in Appendix A of r27s). The same proof can
be applied to our instantiation by simply replacing the map ϕ involved and using a strong
version of the PRF F.1
Note that for a given p, the running time of the decryption in our scheme does not
depend on m, so it provides a small running time even if m is exponentially large. At
the same time, the decryption of the scheme in [27] can also be performed efficiently,
even if m is superpolynomial in the security parameter: discretise the plaintext space
into
?
n equidistant values and let each user choose the value nearest to her original
1For showing Aggregator Obliviousness we would have to substitute the choice of random values t
by a hash function H : M Ñ QR
p2
modeled as a random oracle for some domain M . Therefore the
PRF would be Fsi ptq “ Hptq
si mod p2 which is the strong version of the weak PRF in Example 1. In
this case, all t may be chosen in a deterministic way.
Length of p 1024-bit 2048-bit 4096-bit
[27] 1.1 ms 7.5 ms 57.0 ms
This work 3.9 ms 29.4 ms 225.0 ms
Table 1: Time for encryption
m 100 101 102 103 104
[27] b.-f. 0.04 s 0.24 s 2.67 s 28.97 s 381.05 s
This work 0.09 s 0.08 s 0.08 s 0.09 s 0.08 s
Table 2: Time for decryption (2048 bit, n “ 1000)
one as input for encryption. The aggregated value has the correct expectation, but the
decryption algorithm has to search only in a range of n1.5 values. However, this method
causes a superlinear time-dependence on n for the decryption and induces an additional
aggregation error due to discretisation.
We compare the practical running times for encryption and decryption of the scheme in
[27] with the algorithms of our scheme in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively. Here, let
m denote the size of the plaintext space. Encryption is compared at different security
levels with m “ 1. For comparing the decryption time, we fix the security level and the
number of users and let m be variable.
All algorithms were executed on an Intel Core i5, 64-bit CPU at 2.67 GHz. We compared
the schemes at the same security level, assuming that the DDH problem modulo p is as
hard as modulo p2, i.e. we used the same value for p in both schemes. For different
bit-lengths of p, we observe that the encryption of our scheme is roughly 4 times slower
than the encryption in [27]. The running time of our decryption algorithm is widely
dominated by the aggregation phase. Therefore it is clear, that it linearly depends on
n. Using a 2048-bit prime and fixing n “ 1000, the running time of the decryption in
our scheme is less than 0.1 second for varying values of m. In contrast, the time for the
brute-force decryption in [27] grows roughly linearly in m.
As observed in [27], using Pollard’s lambda method would reduce the running time for
decryption of [27] to about
?
mn. Nevertheless, our scheme provides a speed-up of
a
m{n
wheneverm is larger than n, while the encryption is decelerated only by a constant factor.
4 Achieving Computational Differential Privacy
Notation 1. Let κ be a security parameter. If an expression ω “ ωpκq is non-negligible
in κ (i.e. if ω ą 1{polypκq), then we write ω ą negpκq.
In this section, we describe how to preserve computational differential privacy using
a PSA scheme. As described above, in the work by Chan et al. [7] the polynomial-time
reduction between an attacker against the security of a PSA scheme and an attacker
against differential privacy is missing. In this section we provide an appropriate reduc-
tion. The content of this section is independent of Theorem 2. Specifically, let A be a
mechanism which, given some event Good, evaluates a statistical query f : Dn Ñ O over
a database D P Dn preserving ǫ-DP. Furthermore, let Σ be a secure PSA scheme for f .
We show that A executed through Σ preserves ǫ-CDP given Good. Let Bad “ Good and
assume PrrBads ď δ. In Section 5, we will give instantiations of such a mechanism A
and show that they preserve pǫ, δq-CDP unconditionally if executed through Σ. For sim-
plicity, in this section we focus on sum queries, but our analysis can be easily extended
to more general statistical queries. Our technique involves a reduction-based proof using
a biased coin toss and is of independent interest.
4.1 Redefining the security of Private Stream Aggregation
Let us first modify the security game in Definition 8 in the following way. Let game
1 be the original game from Definition 8. Let p P p0, 1q and P “ maxtp, 1 ´ pu. The
P -game 1 for a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary T1,P is defined as game 1 with
the following changes:
• Before the challenge phase, T1,P sends p to the challenger.
• In the challenge phase, the challenger chooses b “ 0 with probability p and b “ 1
with probability 1´ p.
We call a PSA scheme P -secure if the probability of every probabilistic polynomial-time
adversary T1,P in winning the above game is P ` negpκq. Note that game 1 is a special
case of P -game 1, where P “ 1{2. We refer to this case as the unbiased version (rather
the biased version if P ą 1{2) of P -game 1. In the unbiased case, we just drop the
dependence on P and the adversary is not required to send p to its challenger.
4.2 Constructing a PSA adversary using a CDP adversary
4.2.1 Security game for adjacent databases
For showing that a P -secure PSA scheme is suitable for preserving CDP, we have to con-
struct a successful adversary in P -game 1 (with a proper choice of p) using a successful
distinguisher for adjacent databases. We define the following game 0 for a probabilistic
polynomial-time adversary T0 which is identical to game 1 with a changed challenge-
phase:
Challenge. T0 chooses t
˚ P T such that no encryption query at t˚ was made. T0
queries two adjacent tuples pdr0si qiPU , pdr1si qiPU . For all i P U the challenger returns
ci,t˚ “ PSAEncsipt˚, xrbsi q,
where x
rbs
i P pD is a noisy version of drbsi P D for all i P U obtained by some
randomised perturbation process.
Now consider the following experiment which we call Exp1. Let fD : D
n Ñ O be a sum
query and Q : pDn Ñ r0, 1s a probability distribution function on pDn. For simplicity we
consider only the case where D Ď pD “ Z. Let D0, D1 P Dn. Then Exp1 is performed as
follows:
• Let B1{2 be a Bernoulli variable with PrrB1{2 “ 0s “ 1{2.
• Let pX1 be a random vector with probability distribution function Qpx´Dbq, where
b is a realisation of B1{2.
• Let Y “ f pDp pX1q.
We now define an experiment Exp2 and afterwards show that it is statistically equivalent
to Exp1.
• Let Y be a random variable as in Exp1.
• Let p “ PrrB1{2 “ 0|Y “ ys. Let Bp be a Bernoulli variable with PrrBp “ 0s “ p.
• Let pX2 be a random vector with conditional probability function
Prr pX2 “ pD|Bp “ b, Y “ ys
“
$&%
χpyq¨Qp pD´D0q
2¨p¨PrrY“ys , if b “ 0
χpyq¨Qp pD´D1q
2¨p1´pq¨PrrY“ys , if b “ 1.
Here b is a realisation of Bp and χpyq “ χtzPO|z“fxDp pDqupyq denotes the characteristic
function of tz P O|z “ f pDp pDqu Ă O, which is 1 if y “ f pDp pDq and 0 otherwise.
Note that the values χpyq, Qpxq, p,PrrY “ ys for the computation of the conditional
probability of pX2 are known.
For showing that Exp1 and Exp2 are statistically equivalent it suffices to show that
the joint distributions PrrB1{2, pX1, Y s and PrrBp, pX2, Y s are equal.
Lemma 3. PrrB1{2, pX1, Y s “ PrrBp, pX2, Y s.
Proof. We observe that in Exp1, PrrY “ y| pX1 “ pD,B1{2 “ bs “ PrrY “ y| pX1 “ pDs.
Therefore we have
Prr pX1 “ pD|B1{2 “ b, Y “ ys
“PrrY “ y|
pX1 “ pDs ¨Qp pD ´Dbq
PrrY “ y|B1{2 “ bs
“ χpyq ¨Qp
pD ´Dbq
PrrY “ y|B1{2 “ bs
,
which exactly corresponds to the conditional probability of pX2 in Exp2. Thus, we have
PrrBp, pX2, Y s
“PrrY s ¨ PrrBps ¨ Prr pX2|Bp, Y s
“PrrY s ¨ PrrB1{2|Y s ¨ Prr pX1|B1{2, Y s
“PrrB1{2, pX1, Y s.
Note that Lemma 3 also applies to the marginals of the triples pB1{2, pX1, Y q and pBp, pX2, Y q.
4.2.2 The Reduction
With Lemma 3 in mind, we can show that a successful adversary in game 0 yields a
successful adversary in P -game 1 for a particular P P r1{2, 1q. Afterwards we show that
a successful adversary in P -game 1 for any P P r1{2, 1q yields a successful adversary in
game 1.
Lemma 4. Let κ be a security parameter. Let T0 be an adversary in game 0 with ad-
vantage µ0pκq ą negpκq. Let B1{2 denote the random variable describing the challenge bit
b in game 0 and let Y denote the random variable describing the aggregate of pxrbsi qiPU .
Let p be the probability of B1{2 “ 0 given the choice of Y and let P “ maxtp, 1 ´ pu.
Then there exists an adversary T1,P in P -game 1 with advantage µ1,P pκq ą negpκq.
Proof. We construct a successful adversary T1,P in P -game 1 using T0 as follows:
Setup. Receive κ, pp, T, s from the P -game 1-challenger and send it to T0.
Queries. Receive U “ ti1, . . . , iuu Ď rns from T0 and send it to the challenger. Forward
the obtained response psiqiPrnszU to T0. Forward T0’s queries pi, t, diq with i P U, t P
T, di P D to the challenger and forward the obtained response ci,t to T0.
Challenge. T0 chooses t
˚ P T such that no encryption query at t˚ was made and queries
two adjacent tuples pdr0si qiPU , pdr1si qiPU . Choose a realisation y of Y according
to Exp2. Set p “ PrrB1{2 “ 0|Y “ ys and choose pxrasi qiPU with probability
Prr pX2 “ pxrasi qiPU |B1{2 “ a, Y “ ys for a “ 0, 1 according to Exp2. Send p, t˚,
pxr0si , xr1si qiPU to the challenger. Obtain the response pci,t˚qiPU and forward it to
T0.
Queries. T0 can make the same type of queries as before with the restriction that no
encryption query at t˚ can be made.
Guess. T0 gives a guess about which database was encrypted. Output the same guess.
The rules of P -game 1 are preserved since T1,P sends two tuples of the same aggregate
y to its challenger. On the other hand, since the ciphertexts generated by the challenger
are determined by the challenge bit and the collection pxrbsi qiPU , the rules of game 0 are
preserved by Lemma 3 (the triple pb, pxrbsi qiPU , yq is chosen according to Exp2). Therefore
T1,P perfectly simulates game 0 and has the same advantage as T0.
We now show that a secure PSA scheme is also P -secure for every p P p0, 1q, where
P “ maxtp, 1´ pu.
Lemma 5. Let κ be a security parameter. For any p P p0, 1q let T1,P be an adversary
in P -game 1 with advantage µ1,P pκq ą negpκq. Then there exists an adversary T1 in
game 1 with advantage µ1pκq ą negpκq.
Proof. Given a successful adversary T1,P in P -game 1, we construct a successful adver-
sary T1 in game 1 as follows:
Setup. Receive κ, pp, T, s from the game 1-challenger and send it to T1,P .
Queries. Receive U Ď rns from T1,P and send it to the challenger. Forward the
obtained response psiqiPrnszU to T1,P . Forward T1,P ’s queries pi, t, xiq with i P
U, t P T, xi P pD to the challenger and forward the obtained response ci,t to T1,P .
Challenge. T1,P chooses t
˚ P T such that no encryption query at t˚ was made, sends
p P p0, 1q and queries two different tuples pxr0si qiPU , pxr1si qiPU with f pD|U ppxr0si qiPU q
“ f pD|U ppxr1si qiPU q. Choose a bit a with Prra “ 0s “ p,Prra “ 1s “ 1´ p and query
pxrasi qiPU , pxiqiPU to the challenger, where the xi are chosen uniformly at random
from pD such that f pD|U ppxiqiPU q “ f pD|U ppxrasi qiPU q. Obtain the response pci,t˚qiPU
and forward it to T1,P .
Queries. T1,P can make the same type of queries as before with the restriction that
no encryption query at t˚ can be made.
Guess. T1,P gives a guess about a. If the guess is correct, then output 0; if not, output
1.
If T1,P has output the correct guess about a then T1 can say with high confidence that
the challenge ciphertexts are the encryptions of pxrasi qiPU and therefore outputs 0. On
the other hand, if T1,P ’s guess was not correct, then T1 can say with high confidence
that the challenge ciphertexts are the encryptions of the random collection pxiqiPU and
it outputs 1. Formally:
Case 1. Let pci,t˚qiPU “ pPSAEncsipxrasi qqiPU . Then T1 perfectly simulates P -game 1
for T1,P and the distribution of ciphertexts is the same as in P -game 1:
PrrT1 outputs 0s
“p ¨ PrrT1,P outputs 0 | a “ 0s ` p1´ pq ¨ PrrT1,P outputs 1 | a “ 1s
“PrrT1,P wins P -game 1s
“P ` µ1,P pκq.
Case 2. Let pci,t˚qiPU “ pPSAEncsipxiqqiPU . Then the ciphertexts are random with the
constraint that their product is the same as in the first case. The probability that T1,P
wins game 1 is at most P and
PrrT1 outputs 1s
“p ¨ PrrT1,P outputs 1 | a “ 0s ` p1´ pq ¨ PrrT1,P outputs 0 | a “ 1s ¨ p1 ´ pq
“PrrT1,P loses P -game 1s
ě1´ P.
Finally we obtain that the advantage of T1 in winning game 1 is
µ1pκq ě 1
2
µ1,P pκq ą negpκq.
4.3 Proof of Computational Differential Privacy
We have shown that no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary can win game 0 if the
underlying PSA scheme is secure. If the perturbation process in game 0 is ǫ-DP-preserv-
ing, then the whole construction provides ǫ-CDP, as we show now.
Theorem 6. Let A be a mechanism for a query fD : D
n Ñ O which preserves ǫ-DP
and let Σ be a secure PSA scheme for fD. Then A preserves ǫ-CDP if it is used for the
perturbation process in game 0 instantiated with Σ.
Proof. Consider again game 1, P -game 1 and game 0. We first bound the probability
p “ PrrB1{2 “ 0|Y “ ys for the biased coin in P -game 1. Since the perturbation process
was performed by A, the random variable Y corresponds to the output of A and we have
e´ǫ ¨ PrrY “ y|B1{2 “ 0s ď PrrY “ y|B1{2 “ 1s
ďeǫ ¨ PrrY “ y|B1{2 “ 0s.
By the Bayes-formula we get
pmin :“ 1
1` eǫ ď p ď
eǫ
1` eǫ “: pmax.
Now let T be a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine. Let T1,P denote this Tur-
ing machine as adversary in the P -game 1 for any P “ maxtp, 1 ´ pu with
p P rpmin, pmaxs and let T1 denote the same Turing machine as adversary in game
1. Let finally DCDP “ T0 denote the same machine as adversary in game 0. Then for
a “ 0, 1:
PrrDCDP “ a,B1{2 “ 1s “ PrrT1,P “ a,Bp “ 1s (1)
ďpmax ¨ PrrT1,P “ a|Bp “ 1s
“pmax ¨ PrrT1 “ a|B1{2 “ 1s (2)
ďpmax ¨ PrrT1 “ a|B1{2 “ 0s ` negpκq
“pmax ¨ PrrT1,P “ a|Bp “ 0s ` negpκq (3)
ďpmax
pmin
¨ PrrT1,P “ a,Bp “ 0s ` negpκq
“ eǫ ¨ PrrT1,P “ a,Bp “ 0s ` negpκq
“ eǫ ¨ PrrDCDP “ a,B1{2 “ 0s ` negpκq. (4)
Equations (1) and (4) hold because of Lemma 4 and Equations (2) and (3) hold because
of Lemma 5. It follows that
PrrDCDP “ a|B1{2 “ 1s ď eǫ ¨ PrrDCDP “ a|B1{2 “ 0s ` negpκq.
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, we are considering a mechanism which
preserves ǫ-DP given some event Good. Therefore, also Theorem 6 applies to this mech-
anism given Good. Accordingly, the mechanism unconditionally preserves pǫ, δq-CDP,
where δ is a bound on the probability that Good does not occur.
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Figure 1: Empirical error of the Geometric, Skellam and Binomial mechanisms. The
fixed parameters are ǫ “ 0.1, Spfq “ 1, β “ 0.001. The left graph shows the mean of
the error in absolute value for variable δ and γ “ 1 over 100 runs, the right graph is for
variable γ and δ “ 0.001.
5 Mechanisms for Differential Privacy
In this section we recall the Geometric mechanism from [27] and the Binomial mechanism
from [9] and introduce the Skellam mechanism. Since these mechanisms make use of a
discrete probability distribution, they are well-suited for an execution through a secure
PSA scheme, thereby preserving computational differential privacy as shown in the last
section.
Theorem 7. Let ǫ ą 0. For all databases D P Dn the randomised mechanism
ApDq :“ fpDq ` Y
preserves pǫ, δq-DP with respect to any query f with sensitivity Spfq, if Y is distributed
according to one of the following probability distributions:
1. Y „ Geompλq with λ “ exppǫ{Spfqq (and δ “ 0) [27],
2. Y „ Binpn1, 1{2q with n1 “ 64 ¨ Spfq2 ¨ logp2{δq{ǫ2 [9],
3. Y „ Skpµq2 with
µ “ logp1{δq
1´ coshpǫ{Spfqq ` pǫ{Spfqq ¨ sinhpǫ{Spfqq .
We provide the proof of the third claim in Appendix B. Executing these mechanisms
through a PSA scheme requires the use of the known constant γ which denotes the a
priori estimate of the lower bound on the fraction of non-compromised users. For this
case, we provide the accuracy bounds for the aforementioned mechanisms.
2Skpµq denotes the symmetric Skellam distribution with mean 0 and variance µ. For details, see
Appendix B.
Theorem 8. Let ǫ ą 0, 0 ă δ ă 1, Spfq ą 0 and let 0 ă γ ă 1 be the a priori estimate of
the lower bound on the fraction of non-compromised users in the network. By distributing
the execution of a perturbation mechanism as described above and using the parameters
from Theorem 7, we obtain pα, βq-accuracy with the following parameters:
1. α “ 4¨Spfq
ǫ
¨
c
1
γ
¨ log ` 1
δ
˘ ¨ log´ 2
β
¯
for the Geometric mechanism, where δ bounds
the probability that no user has added noise [27],
2. α “ 8
?
2¨Spfq
ǫ
¨
c
1
γ
¨ log ` 2
δ
˘ ¨ log´ 2
β
¯
for the Binomial mechanism,
3. α “ Spfq
ǫ
¨
´
1
γ
¨ log ` 1
δ
˘` log´ 2
β
¯¯
for the Skellam mechanism.
The second claim can be easily shown using a standard tail bound for the Binomial
distribution. The proof of the third claim is provided in Appendix B.
Theorem 8 shows that for constant δ, β, γ the errors of the three mechanisms are bounded
by OpSpfq{ǫq and therefore do not exceed known bounds in the centralised model. As
pointed out in Section 2.3, the execution of the Geometric mechanism through a PSA
scheme requires each user to generate full noise with a small probability. Complementary,
the other two mechanisms allow all users to simply generate noise of small variance.
While the accuracy bound of the Geometric is roughly a constant factor smaller than
the bound of the Binomial, we obtain a better bound for this second approach using
the Skellam mechanism. Specifically, the ratio between the factor logp2{βq ` logp1{δq{γ
in the accuracy of the Skellam mechanism and the factor
a
logp2{βq ¨ logp1{δq{γ in the
accuracy of the Geometric mechanism goes to 0 when δ and β go to 0. For example, fix
Spfq “ 1, δ “ 0.01, α “ 50, β “ 0.1, γ “ 1. Then the Geometric mechanism preserves
pǫ, δq-CDP with ǫ « 0.30, while the Skellam mechanism preserves pǫ, δq-CDP with ǫ «
0.15. An empirical accuracy comparison between the mechanisms is shown in Figure
1. We observe that the error of the Geometric and the Skellam mechanisms have a
similar behaviour for both variables δ and γ, while the error of the Binomial mechanism
is roughly three times larger. Finally, we are able to prove our main result, Theorem 1,
which follows from the preceding analyses.
Proof of Theorem 1. The claim follows from Theorem 6 together with Theorem 2 (in-
stantiated with the efficient construction in Example 1) and from Theorem 7 together
with Theorem 8.
6 Conclusions
In this work we continued a line of research opened by the work of Shi et al. [27]. By
lowering the security definition of a PSA scheme, we were able to prove that a secure
scheme (in this sense) can be built upon key-homomorphic weak PRFs. Based on the
DDH assumption, we gave an instantiation of a secure PSA scheme. If the plaintext
space is large enough, it has a substantially more efficient decryption algorithm than the
scheme in [27] at the cost of a slightly less efficient encryption algorithm, and achieves
non-adaptive security in the standard model. Using the notion of computational differ-
ential privacy, we provided a connection between a secure PSA scheme and a mechanism
preserving differential privacy by showing that a differentially private mechanism pre-
serves computational differential privacy if it is executed through a secure PSA scheme.
Moreover, we compared the accuracy of the Geometric, the Binomial and the Skellam
mechanisms which preserve differential privacy and are suitable for an execution through
a PSA scheme. While the practical performances of the Geometric and the Skellam mech-
anisms are equally better than the performance of the Binomial mechanism, we were able
to provide a slightly better bound for the Skellam mechanism at high privacy levels.
A Proof of Theorem 2
Let game 1 be the security game from Definition 8 instantiated for the PSA scheme of
Theorem 2. We need to show that the advantage µ1pκq of a probabilistic polynomial-
time adversary T1 in winning this game is negligible in the security parameter κ. We
define the following intermediate game 2 for a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary
T2 and then show that winning game 1 is at least as hard as winning game 2.
Setup. The challenger runs the Setup algorithm on input security parameter κ and
returns public parameters pp, time-steps T and secret keys s, s1, . . . , sn with s “
p˚ni“1 siq´1. It sends κ, pp, T, s to T2.
Queries. The challenger flips a random bit b PR t0, 1u. T2 chooses U “ ti1, . . . , iuu Ď
rns and sends it to the challenger which returns psiqiPrnszU . T2 is allowed to query
pi, t, xiq with i P U, t P T, xi P pD and the challenger returns the following: if b “ 0
it sends Fsiptq ¨ ϕpxiq to T2; if b “ 1 it chooses
h1,t, . . . , hu´1,t PR G1,
hu,t :“
uź
j“1
Fsij ptq ¨
˜
u´1ź
j“1
hj,t
¸´1
and sends hi,t ¨ ϕpxiq to T2.
Challenge. T2 chooses t
˚ P T such that no encryption query at t˚ was made and
queries a tuple pxiqiPU . If b “ 0 the challenger sends pFsipt˚q ¨ ϕpxiqqiPU to T2; if
b “ 1 it chooses
h1,t˚ , . . . , hu´1,t˚ PR G1,
hu,t˚ :“
uź
j“1
Fsij pt˚q ¨
˜
u´1ź
j“1
hj,t˚
¸´1
and sends phi,t˚ ¨ ϕpxiqqiPU to T2.
Queries. T2 is allowed to make the same type of queries as before with the restriction
that no encryption query at t˚ can be made.
Guess. T2 outputs a guess about b.
The adversary wins the game if it correctly guesses b.
Lemma 9. Let κ be a security parameter. Let T1 be an adversary in game 1 with
advantage µ1pκq ą negpκq. Then there exists an adversary T2 in game 2 with advantage
µ2pκq ą negpκq.
Proof. Given a successful adversary T1 in game 1 we construct a successful adversary
T2 in game 2 as follows:
Setup. Receive κ, pp, T, s from the game 2-challenger and send it to T1.
Queries. Flip a random bit b PR t0, 1u. Receive U “ ti1, . . . , iuu Ď rns from T1 and
send it to the challenger. Forward the obtained response psiqiPrnszU to T1. Forward
T1’s queries pi, t, xiq with i P U, t P T, xi P pD to the challenger and forward the
obtained response ci,t to T1.
Challenge. T1 chooses t
˚ P T such that no encryption query at t˚ was made and
queries two different tuples pxr0si qiPU , pxr1si qiPU with
ř
iPU x
r0s
i “
ř
iPU x
r1s
i . Query
pxrbsi qiPU to the challenger. Obtain the response pci,t˚qiPU and forward it to T1.
Queries. T1 can make the same type of queries as before with the restriction that no
encryption query at t˚ can be made.
Guess. T1 gives a guess about b. If the guess is correct, then output 0; if not, output
1.
If T1 has output the correct guess about b then T2 can say with high confidence that the
challenge ciphertexts were generated using a weak PRF and therefore outputs 0. On the
other hand, if T1’s guess was not correct, then T2 can say with high confidence that the
challenge ciphertexts were generated using random values and it outputs 1. Formally:
Case 1. Let pci,t˚qiPU “ pFsipt˚q ¨ ϕpxrbsi qqiPU . Then T2 perfectly simulates game 1 for
T1 and the distribution of the ciphertexts is the same as in game 1:
PrrT2 outputs 0s “1
2
pPrrT1 outputs 0 | b “ 0s ` PrrT1 outputs 1 | b “ 1sq
“PrrT1 wins game 1s
“1
2
` µ1pκq.
Case 2. Let pci,t˚qiPU “ phi,t˚ ¨ ϕpxrbsi qqiPU . Then the ciphertexts are random with the
constraint ź
iPU
ci,t˚ “
ź
iPU
Fsipt˚q ¨ ϕpxrbsi q
such that decryption yields the same sum as in case 1. Because of the perfect security
of the one-time pad the probability that T1 wins game 1 is 1{2 and
PrrT2 outputs 1s “1
2
pPrrT1 outputs 1 | b “ 0s ` PrrT1 outputs 0 | b “ 1sq
“PrrT1 loses game 1s
“1
2
.
Finally we obtain that the advantage of T2 in winning game 2 is
µ2pκq “ 1
2
µ1pκq ą negpκq.
For a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary T3, we define a new intermediate game 3
out of game 2 by just cancelling the plaintext dependence in each step of game 2, i.e.
in the encryption queries and in the challenge, instead of pi, t, xiq the adversary T3 now
just queries pi, tq and the challenger in game 3 sends
Fsiptq, if b “ 0,
hi,t, if b “ 1
to the adversary T3. The rest remains the same as in game 2.
It is easy to see that if there exists a successful adversary in game 2 then there is also
a successful adversary in game 3.
Lemma 10. Let κ be a security parameter. Let T2 be an adversary in game 2 with
advantage µ2pκq ą negpκq. Then there exists an adversary T3 in game 3 with advantage
µ3pκq ą negpκq.
Remark 2. For comparison to the proof of adaptive security by Shi et al. [27] we
emphasise that in the reduction from Aggregator Obliviousness to an intermediate problem
(Proof of Theorem 1 in [27]) an adversary B has to compute the ciphertexts ci “ gxiHptqsi
for all users i P rns and for all (!) time-steps t, since B does not know in advance for
which i P rns it will have to use the PRF Hptqsi and for which i P rns it will have to use
real random values. Thus, B has to program the random oracle H in order to know for
all t the corresponding random number z with Hptq “ gz (where g is a generator) for
simulating the original Aggregator Obliviousness game. In contrast, in the reduction for
our non-adaptive version of Aggregator Obliviousness, it is not necessary to program such
an oracle, since the simulating adversary T2 knows in advance the set of non-compromised
users and, for all (!) t, it can already decide for which i P rns it will use the PRF (which
in our case is tsi instead of Hptqsi) and for which i P rns it will use a real random value.
In the next step, the problem of distinguishing the weak PRF family
F “ tFs :M Ñ G1usPS
from a random function family has to be reduced to the problem of winning game 3.
We use a hybrid argument.
Lemma 11. Let κ be a security parameter. Let T3 be an adversary in game 3 with
advantage µ3pκq. Then µ3pκq ď negpκq if
F “ tFs |Fs :M Ñ G1usPS
is a weak PRF family.
Proof. We define the following sequence of hybrid games, game 3l with l “ 1, . . . , u´ 1,
for a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary T3l .
Setup. As in game 3.
Queries. The challenger flips a random bit b PR t0, 1u. T3l chooses U “ ti1, . . . , iuu Ď
rns and sends it to the challenger which returns psiqiPrnszU . T3l is allowed to query
pi, tq with i P U, t P T and the challenger returns the following: if i R ti1, . . . , il`bu
it sends Fsiptq to T3l ; if i P ti1, . . . , il`bu it chooses
h1,t, . . . , hl´p1´bq,t PR G1,
hl`b,t :“
l`bź
j“1
Fsij ptq ¨
¨˝
l´p1´bqź
j“1
hj,t‚˛
´1
and sends hi,t to T3l .
Challenge. T3l chooses t
˚ P T such that no encryption query at t˚ was made. The
challenger chooses
h1,t˚ , . . . , hl´p1´bq,t˚ PR G1,
hl`b,t˚ :“
l`bź
j“1
Fsij pt˚q ¨
¨˝
l´p1´bqź
j“1
hj,t˚‚˛
´1
and sends the following sequence to T3l :
ph1,t˚ , . . . , hl`b,t˚ ,Fsil`b`1 pt˚q, . . . ,Fsiu pt˚qq.
Queries. T3l can make the same type of queries as before with the restriction that no
encryption query at t˚ can be made.
Guess. T3l outputs a guess about b.
The adversary wins the game if it correctly guesses b.
It is easy to see that game 31 with b “ 0 corresponds to the case b “ 0 in game 3
and game 3u´1 with b “ 1 corresponds to the case b “ 1 in game 3. Moreover the
ciphertexts in game 3l with b “ 1 have the same distribution as the ciphertexts in game
3l`1 with b “ 0. Therefore
PrrT3l`1 wins game 3l`1 | b “ 0s “ PrrT3l loses game 3l | b “ 1s.
Using a successful adversary T3l in game 3l we construct a successful probabilistic
polynomial-time distinguisher DPRF which has access to an oracle
Op¨q PR tFs1p¨q, randp¨qu, where
Fs1 :M Ñ G1
is a weak PRF and
rand :M Ñ G1
is a real random function. DPRF gets κ as input and proceeds as follows.
1. Choose two indices k1, k2 P rns and guess that k1, k2 will be the ithl , ithl`1 indices in
U specified by the adversary T3l . This guess will be correct with probability 1{n2.
2. Choose s PR S,si PR S for all i P rnsztk1, k2u, generate pp and T with t PR M for
all t P T . Compute Fsptq for all t P T .
3. Make oracle queries for t and receive Optq for all t P T .
4. Send κ, pp, T, s to T3l .
5. Queries. Receive U “ ti1, . . . , iuu Ď rns from T3l . If il ‰ k1 or il`1 ‰ k2 then
abort. Else send psiqiPrnszU to T3l . If T3l queries pi, tq with i P U, t P T then return
the following: if i R ti1, . . . , il`1u send Fsiptq to T3l ; if i “ il`1 “ ik2 send Optq to
T3l ; if i P ti1, . . . , ilu choose
h1,t, . . . , hl´1,t PR G1,
hl,t :“
¨˝
Fsptq ¨Optq ¨
l´1ź
j“1
hj,t ¨
ź
iPrnszti1,...,il`1u
Fsiptq‚˛
´1
and send hi,t to T3l .
6. Challenge. T3l chooses t
˚ P T such that no encryption query at t˚ was made.
Choose
h1,t˚ , . . . , hl´1,t˚ PR G1,
hl,t˚ :“
¨˝
Fspt˚q ¨Opt˚q ¨
l´1ź
j“1
hj,t˚ ¨
ź
iPrnszti1,...,il`1u
Fsipt˚q‚˛
´1
and send the following sequence to T3l :
ph1,t˚ , . . . , hl,t˚ ,Opt˚q,Fsil`2 pt˚q, . . . ,Fsiu pt˚qq.
7. Queries. T3l can make the same type of queries as before with the restriction that
no encryption query at t˚ can be made.
8. Guess. T3l outputs a guess about whether the i
th
l`1 element is random or pseudo-
random. Output the same guess.3
If T3l has output the correct guess about whether the i
th
l`1 element is random or pseudo-
random then DPRF can distinguish between Fs1p¨q and randp¨q. Now we prove this result
formally and show that, in this way, game 3l is perfectly simulated by T3l .
Case 1. Let Op¨q “ Fs1p¨q. Define sil`1 :“ s1. Since S,M are groups, there exists an
element sil with
sil “ ps ˚ ˚
iPrnsztilu
siq´1
and for all t P T : ¨˝
Fsptq ¨ Fs1ptq ¨
ź
iPrnszti1,...,il`1u
Fsiptq‚˛
´1
“
lź
j“1
Fsij ptq.
Then for all t P T the value hl,t is equal to¨˝
Fsptq ¨
l´1ź
j“1
hj,t ¨ Fs1ptq ¨
ź
iPrnszti1,...,il`1u
Fsiptq‚˛
´1
“
lź
j“1
Fsij ptq ¨
˜
l´1ź
j“1
hj,t
¸´1
.
Therefore the distribution of the ciphertexts corresponds exactly to the case in game 3l
with b “ 0.
Case 2. Let Op¨q “ randp¨q. Define the random elements
hl`1,t :“ randptq
for all t P T . Since S,M are groups, there exists an element s1 P S with
s1 “ ps ˚ ˚
iPrnsztil,il`1u
siq´1.
Let sil PR S and sil`1 :“ s1 ˚ s´1il . Then for all t P T :¨˝
Fsptq ¨
ź
iPrnszti1,...,il`1u
Fsiptq‚˛
´1
“
l`1ź
j“1
Fsij ptq
and the value hl,t is equal to¨˝
Fsptq ¨ hl`1,t ¨
l´1ź
j“1
hj,t ¨
ź
iPrnszti1,...,il`1u
Fsiptq‚˛
´1
3Essentially, here the specification of the set of non-compromised users before making any query
allows DPRF to be consistent with pseudo-random values or real random values in its replies to the
queries.
and equivalently
hl`1,t “
l`1ź
j“1
Fsij ptq ¨
˜
lź
j“1
hj,t
¸´1
.
Therefore the distribution of the ciphertexts corresponds exactly to the case in game 3l
with b “ 1.
Without loss of generality, let
PrrT3l wins game 3l | b “ 0s ě PrrT3l loses game 3l | b “ 1s.
All in all, we obtain
PrrT3l wins game 3l | b “ 0s ´ PrrT3l loses game 3l | b “ 1s
“PrrDFs1 p¨qPRF pκq “ 1 | il “ k1, il`1 “ k2s ´ PrrDrandp¨qPRF pκq “ 1 | il “ k1, il`1 “ k2s
ďn2 ¨ pPrrDFs1 p¨qPRF pκq “ 1s ´ PrrDrandp¨qPRF pκq “ 1sq
and since n is polynomial in κ, this expression is negligible by the pseudo-randomness of
Fs1p¨q on uniformly chosen input. Therefore, the advantage of T3l in winning game 3l is
negligible.
Finally, by a hybrid argument we have:
PrrT3 wins game 3s
“1
2
pPrrT3 wins game 3 | b “ 0s ` PrrT3 wins game 3 | b “ 1sq
“1
2
pPrrT31 wins game 31 | b “ 0s ` PrrT3u´1 wins game 3u´1 | b “ 1sq
“1
2
` 1
2
pPrrT31 wins game 31 | b “ 0s ´ PrrT3u´1 loses game 3u´1 | b “ 1sq
“1
2
` 1
2
u´1ÿ
l“1
PrrT3l wins game 3l | b “ 0s ´ PrrT3l loses game 3l | b “ 1s
“1
2
` negpκq.
We can now complete the proof of Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. By Lemma 9 - 11:
µ1pκq “ 2 ¨ µ2pκq “ 2 ¨ µ3pκq “ 2 ¨ pu ´ 1q ¨ n2 ¨ negpκq ă 2 ¨ n3 ¨ negpκq “ negpκq.
B The Skellam mechanism
B.1 Preliminaries
As observed before, the distributed noise generation is feasible with a probability dis-
tribution function closed under convolution. For this purpose, we recall the Skellam
distribution.
Definition 9 (Skellam Distribution [28]). Let µ1, µ2 ą 0. A discrete random variable
X is drawn according to the Skellam distribution with parameters µ1, µ2 (short: X „
Skpµ1, µ2q) if it has the following probability distribution function ψµ1,µ2 : Z ÞÑ R:
ψµ1,µ2pkq “ e´pµ1`µ2q
ˆ
µ1
µ2
˙k{2
Ikp2?µ1µ2q,
where Ik is the modified Bessel function of the first kind (see pages 374–378 in r1s).
A random variable X „ Skpµ1, µ2q has variance µ1 ` µ2 and can be generated as
the difference of two random variables drawn according to the Poisson distribution of
mean µ1 and µ2, respectively [28]. Note that the Skellam distribution is not generally
symmetric. However, we mainly consider the particular case µ1 “ µ2 “ µ{2 and refer to
this symmetric distribution as Skpµq “ Skpµ{2, µ{2q.
Lemma 12 ([28]). Let X „ Skpµ1, µ2q and Y „ Skpµ3, µ4q be independent random
variables. Then Z :“ X ` Y is distributed according to Skpµ1 ` µ3, µ2 ` µ4q.
An induction step shows that the sum of n i.i.d. symmetric Skellam random variables
with variance µ is a symmetric Skellam random variable with variance nµ. Suppose that
adding symmetric Skellam noise with variance µ preserves pǫ, δq-DP. Recall that the
network is given an a priori known estimate γ of the lower bound on the fraction of non-
compromised users. We define µuser “ µ{pγnq and instruct the users to add symmetric
Skellam noise with variance µuser to their own data. If compromised users will not add
noise, the total noise will be still sufficient to preserve pǫ, δq-DP.
For our analysis, we will use the following bound on the ratio of modified Bessel functions
of the first kind.
Lemma 13 ([17]). For real k ą 0 let Ikpµq be the modified Bessel function of the first
kind and order k. Then
Ikpµq
Ik`1pµq ă
µ
´pk ` 1q `
a
pk ` 1q2 ` µ2 .
For the privacy analysis of the Skellam mechanism, we need a tail bound on the
symmetric Skellam distribution.
Lemma 14. Let X „ Skpµq and let σ ą 0. Then, for all τ ě ´σµ,
PrrX ą σµ` τ s
ď e´µp1´
?
1`σ2`σ lnpσ`?1`σ2qq´τ lnpσ`?1`σ2q.
Proof. We use standard techniques from probability theory. Applying Markov’s inequal-
ity, for any t ą 0,
PrrX ą σµ` τ s “PrretX ą etpσµ`τqs
ď Ere
tXs
etpσµ`τq
.
As shown in [15], for X „ Skpµq, the moment generating function of X is
EretXs “ e´µp1´coshptqq,
where coshptq “ pet ` e´tq{2. Hence, we have
PrrX ą σµ` τ s ď e´µp1´coshptq`tσq´tτ .
Fix t “ lnpσ ` ?1` σ2q. In order to conclude the proof, we observe that coshplnpσ `?
1` σ2qq “ ?1` σ2.
One can easily verify that, for σ ą 0,
1´
a
1` σ2 ` σ lnpσ `
a
1` σ2q ą 0.
B.2 Analysis of the Skellam mechanism
In this section, we provide a bound on the variance µ of the symmetric Skellam dis-
tribution (as stated in Theorem 7) that is needed in order to preserve pǫ, δq-differential
privacy and we compute the error that is thus introduced.
Privacy analysis
Theorem 15. Let ǫ ą 0 and let 0 ă δ ă 1. For all databases D P Dn the randomised
mechanism
ASkpDq :“ fpDq ` Y
preserves pǫ, δq-DP with respect to any query f of sensitivity Spfq, where Y „ Skpµq with
µ ě logp1{δq
1´ coshpǫ{Spfqq ` pǫ{Spfqq ¨ sinhpǫ{Spfqq .
Proof. Let D0, D1 P Dn be adjacent databases with |fpD0q´fpD1q| ď Spfq. The largest
ratio between PrrASkpD0q “ Rs and PrrASkpD1q “ Rs is reached when k :“ R´fpD0q “
R´ fpD1q ´ Spfq ě 0, where R is any possible output of ASk. Then, by Lemma 13, for
all possible outputs R of ASk:
PrrASkpD0q “ Rs
PrrASkpD1q “ Rs “
PrrY “ ks
PrrY “ k ` Spfqs
“
Spfqź
j“1
PrrY “ k ` j ´ 1s
PrrY “ k ` js
ă
Spfqź
j“1
µ
´pk ` jq `
a
pk ` jq2 ` µ2
ďeǫ. (5)
Inequality (5) holds if k ď sinhpǫ{Spfqq ¨µ´Spfq, since it implies k ď sinhpǫ{Spfqq ¨µ´j
for all j “ 1, . . . , Spfq and
µ
´pk ` jq `
a
pk ` jq2 ` µ2 ď e
ǫ{Spfq.
Applying Lemma 14 with σ “ sinhpǫ{Spfqq and τ “ ´Spfq, we get
Prrk ą sinhpǫ{Spfqq ¨ µ´ Spfqs
ďe´µ¨p1´coshpǫ{Spfqq`pǫ{Spfqq¨sinhpǫ{Spfqqq`ǫ
and this expression is set to be smaller or equal than δ. This inequality is satisfied if
µ ě logp1{δq
1´ coshpǫ{Spfqq ` pǫ{Spfqq ¨ sinhpǫ{Spfqq .
Remark 3. The bound on µ from Theorem 15 is smaller than 2 ¨ pSpfq{ǫq2 ¨ logp1{δq,
thus the standard deviation of Y „ Skpµq is linear in Spfq{ǫ (for constant δ).
Accuracy analysis
Theorem 16. Let ǫ ą 0 and 0 ă δ ă 1. Then for all 0 ă β ă 1 the mechanism specified
in Theorem 15 has pα, βq-accuracy, where
α “ Spfq
ǫ
¨
ˆ
log
ˆ
2
β
˙
` log
ˆ
1
δ
˙˙
.
Proof. Let µ “ logp1{δq
1´coshpǫ{Spfqq`pǫ{Spfqq¨sinhpǫ{Spfqq be the bound on the variance for the
Skellam mechanism provided in Theorem 15. Now, as in the proof of Lemma 14, for
α1 ą 0,
Prr|N | ą α1s “2 ¨ PrrN ą α1s
ď2 ¨ e´µ¨p1´coshpǫ{Spfqqq´pǫ{Spfqq¨α1
and this expression is set to be equal to β. Solving this equality for α1 yields
α1 “Spfq
ǫ
¨
ˆ
log
ˆ
2
β
˙
`
ˆ
cosh
ˆ
ǫ
Spfq
˙
´ 1
˙
¨ µ
˙
ďSpfq
ǫ
¨
ˆ
log
ˆ
2
β
˙
` log
ˆ
1
δ
˙˙
“α.
For the distributed noise generation, each single user adds symmetric Skellam noise with
variance µuser “ µ{pγnq to her data. The worst case for accuracy is when all n users
add noise, thus the total noise N is a symmetric Skellam variable with variance µ{γ and
the accuracy becomes
α “ Spfq
ǫ
¨
ˆ
log
ˆ
2
β
˙
` 1
γ
¨ log
ˆ
1
δ
˙˙
,
proving the third claim of Theorem 8.
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